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Abstract We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for
wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively
by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage
offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined
by the public, since wage competition may lead to higher wage costs or to the election
of less competent candidates.
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine how politicians’ wages should be determined. If politicians
in office provide public goods, remunerations should ensure that the most competent
citizen runs for office and will be elected at minimum wage costs. The central institu-
tional design issue of this paper is motivated as follows: There exist two institutional
frameworks in which wages of politicians are determined. First, politicians face a given
remuneration schedule when they run for office. For instance, individuals running for
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an office of the executive branch face wage rates determined by laws which, in turn,
have been formulated in the parliament that represents the electorate.
Second, politicians may have a major impact on their own remuneration. In
particular, most parliaments design the laws that stipulate compensation for their
members. How self-designed remuneration packages influence politicians’ decisions
on whether to run has been demonstrated in a wealth of research. For instance, Hall
and Van Houwelling (1995) analyze the impact of a 1990 law that significantly increa-
sed pensions for US-congressmen who retired after 1992. They find that a significant
number of congressmen who otherwise would have retired in 1990 decided to re-run
for office in order to receive this financial windfall.1
In a stylized model, we compare both these institutional settings determining the
remuneration of politicians. We consider a citizen-as-candidate model, where an elec-
ted politician undertakes policy projects for a society. Candidates may differ in compe-
tence, and wages for politicians are financed by taxes. Our main insights are as follows:
First, as a rule, the competence of elected candidates is equal or higher when the public
determines wages optimally as opposed to remuneration being self-designed by can-
didates. Second, in the case of competitive wage offers by candidates, social welfare
is usually lower than in the case of predetermined remuneration. The intuition for this
result is as follows: Since taxation is distortionary, higher wages impose economic
costs on the electorate. On the other hand, higher wages may prompt the more com-
petent politicians (as well as less competent ones) to run for office, which generates
economic benefits as voters can elect the more competent candidate for office. The
two wage schemes—publicly determined wages and competitive wages—solve this
trade-off differently. Competition bids up wages beyond the level required for an effi-
cient selection of politicians. The more competent candidate is the residual claimant
as he can ask for wages that make voters indifferent between both candidates. The
more competent candidate—who knows that he produces a larger surplus—proposes
a wage that allows him to capture all the extra surplus he generates. If wages are set by
the electorate, then the wage must be just high enough to induce the better candidate
to run for office, thus ensuring that the extra surplus that candidate generates goes to
the voters. In this case voters are the residual claimants. Since wages are financed by
distortionary taxes, welfare is higher with predetermined wages.
The current analysis draws on four strands in the literature. First, there exist a num-
ber of recent papers that discuss how the value of office affects the quality of politicians
and their incentives to pursue socially efficient policies. Besley (2004) examines how
paying politicians can solve the agency problems of incumbents who are subject to a
two-period term limit. Caselli and Morelli (2004) examine how the quality of elected
politicians is affected by the value of office when candidates know in advance whe-
ther they can convince the electorate of their abilities. Messner and Polborn (2003)
develop a new type of citizen-candidate model by assuming that the abilities of candi-
dates are observable to voters, whereas their opportunity costs are private information.
Poutvaara and Takalo (2003) develop a tractable citizen-candidate model that allows
for unobserved ability differences, informative campaigning, and political parties.
1 Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994), Keane and Merlo (2002), and Besley (2004) also identify the importance
of financial considerations for politicians when they run for office.
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These recent advances in modeling representative democracies illustrate that increa-
sing the value of office does not necessarily increase the average quality of candidates.
None of the preceding papers, however, focuses on the comparison between
remuneration set by the public and self-designed wages as attempted in this paper.
Second, incentive elements in politics, other than elections, have been discussed,
e.g., by Gersbach (2003), where the value of holding office in the second term is made
dependent on the realization of macroeconomic variables. This increases the incentive
for politicians to undertake socially desirable policies with long-term consequences
in the first term. Politicians are allowed to offer their own long-term wage contracts
during campaigns. In contrast, in this paper we consider the competition of politicians
for wages and office in a single term in the context of a citizen-as-candidate set-
up. While the above literature suggests that contract competition between politicians
is welfare-improving, our current paper provides a counter-argument. We show that
politicians should not be allowed to offer their own remuneration schemes for the next
term.
Third, candidates holding office will provide a public good, so we may face the
standard free-riding and underprovision problem when public goods are privately
supplied by a set of actors. This problem is discussed, e.g., in Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1984), Bergstrom et al. (1986), Güth and Hellwig (1986), and recently Hellwig (2001).
In our model, the interaction of the entry decisions of two actors is the only factor
determining the level of a public good. Hence, for this simple public-good problem
the public can overcome the underprovision problem by setting wages or by allowing
politicians to offer wage schemes.
Fourth, we use a simplified version of the citizen-as-candidate model, as developed
by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). In such settings, citizens
who consider running for office must take into account the private costs incurred by
running for office, benefits from policies they would like to undertake, and benefits
from policies other potential candidates are likely to implement.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the model.
We then examine fixed wages set by the public. In Sect. 4 we identify equilibria in
cases where politicians can propose their remuneration. Section 5 contains the welfare
comparison. In Sect. 6 we discuss the importance of our assumptions and several
extensions of our model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The set-up
We consider a society with N voters who have to elect a politician undertaking policy
projects for all members of the group. There are two potential candidates, i = 1, 2,
for this job. The remaining N − 2 individuals cannot be candidates and only act as
voters.2 Candidates differ in their competence: with his policies candidate i (i = 1, 2)
can generate a net benefit bi > 0 for every member of the society. We label candidates
2 We assume that N is greater than 4, i.e., there are more voters not seeking office than there are candidates.
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in such a way that b1 > b2. The value of bi can be associated with the competency of
candidates.
For each candidate i , there is an individual net cost ci incurred by serving in office.
This cost includes effort and opportunity costs involved in serving in office and any
gains from being in office. If the latter source of utility is more important, we have
ci < 0. ci is assumed to be perfectly observable by the voters. The elected politician
receives a wage that is financed by distortionary taxation, which is levied on all other
members of the society.3 Let λ ≥ 0 denote the shadow cost of public funds. That is,
taxation uses (1 + λ) of tax payers’ resources in order to levy 1 unit of resources for
paying wages to candidates in office. The utility of candidate i if he is elected and
earns the wage W is
bi + W − ci , (1)
while the utility of any other member of the society is
bi − W (1 + λ)N − 1 . (2)
If no potential candidate is willing to run, then a default policy will be implemented
yielding a benefit of b0 = 0 for every voter. If only one candidate runs for office, then
he will automatically assume power.
2.2 Assumptions and economic problem
We compare two institutional systems of determining wages for elected politicians:
remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates
during campaigning. We make two types of assumptions.
The first assumption defines the economic problem. It is assumed that the compe-
tency of candidates, i.e., the values of bi , are observable by the public but not verifiable
in a court. Hence, the public cannot make individualized wage offers. The rationale
for this assumption is discussed extensively in the incomplete-contract literature (see
Hart 1995 or Watson 2007). For instance, abilities of candidates may become known
to other agents, but it is impossible to prove in a court that one individual has greater
competence than another for undertaking future tasks in a public office.
This assumption introduces the following trade-off: When candidates themselves
offer wages, they can offer different remunerations reflecting their interests. However,
candidates do not care about social welfare as such. The public, in contrast, is concerned
about social welfare but cannot offer different wages to the candidates and thus cannot
replicate the outcome itself under competitive wage offers. If the public were offering
different wages, the candidate with a lower wage could go to court claiming that he
3 In principle, our model allows for negative wages when candidates are highly interested in power and bid
for office. In such cases, shadow costs of public funds should be set at zero.
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has the same level of competency and would win because of the verification problem
discussed above.4
The second set of assumptions is made for tractability. In particular, we assume zero
cost for running as candidate, status-quo utility of zero when no candidate is running
for office, observable utility from holding office expressed by ci , two candidates, and
linear dead weight costs λ. In Sect. 6 on robustness, we discuss the importance of
these assumptions for our results.
2.3 The institutions
Here we outline the timing for both scenarios. In the first scenario, we discuss how
voters would determine the wages for politicians. The timing in the first scenario is as
follows:
Stage 1: Voters decide on the level of the politician’s wage denoted by W .
Stage 2: The candidates decide simultaneously whether to run for office or not.
Stage 3: The voters elect one of the two candidates.
It is obvious in this first scenario that, if both candidates run for office, it is always
optimal for the voters to elect candidate 1, because b1 > b2 and the wages for both
candidates are identical. Note that we assume complete information. That is, voters
observe the parameters {b1, b2, c1, c2} before they set their wages.
In the second scenario, candidates themselves can offer wages, denoted by W1 and
W2, which become effective if a candidate runs and is elected. Therefore, in the second
scenario, the first two stages are replaced by:
Stage 1′: Candidates offer W1 and W2.
Note that it is always possible for a candidate to propose a salary so large that he
will never get elected. Therefore, we do not explicitly model a stage where candidates
decide whether to run or not in the second scenario. Throughout the paper, we use the
weak dominance concept in the following way: In every possible voting game in the
first or second scenario, voters are assumed to employ only strategies that are weakly
undominated in that subgame. This refinement produces unique voting outcomes for
every subgame (if we include tie-breaking rules when voters are indifferent). Given
the equilibrium voting behavior, we look at running equilibria (first scenario) or wage
offer equilibria (second scenario) of candidates, where we again eliminate weakly
dominated strategies if they exist.
3 Fixed wages
We first consider fixed wages and obtain our first result.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium for stages 2 and 3 that depends on the
wage level in the following way:
4 Note that public law in modern democracies prohibits different wage settings for public office without
verifiable evidence.
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• If W ≥ c2 − b2 and
W ≥ N − 1
N + λ
(
c1 − (b1 − b2)
)
, (3)
then both candidates run for office and candidate 1 is elected.
• If W ≥ c2 − b2 and
W <
N − 1
N + λ
(
c1 − (b1 − b2)
)
, (4)
then candidate 2 runs for office and is elected.
• If W < c2 − b2 and W ≥ c1 − b1, then candidate 2 does not run for office.
Candidate 1 runs for office and is elected.
• If W < c2 − b2 and W < c1 − b1, no candidate runs for office.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. Proposition 1 indicates the
considerations the public has to weigh up in determining optimal wages. A higher
wage may prompt the more competent candidate to run for office. Higher wages,
however, will also attract the bad candidate. Nevertheless, as the more competent
candidate will be elected if he runs for office, the public can always ensure that the
more competent candidate will take office by specifying an appropriate wage. As
higher wages imply more deadweight costs, the public has to trade off competency of
office holders against the deadweight costs of financing the remuneration of politicians.
We will later determine the optimal wage levels the public should set for the political
race.
4 Competition for wage contracts
In this section we explore what happens if candidates can offer to perform politi-
cal duties for a certain wage. After the candidates have proposed their remuneration
scheme, the voters elect the candidate who will create the highest utility for them.
Thus, the timing is as follows:
Stage 1′: Each candidate proposes a remuneration scheme Wi .
Stage 2: The voters observe W1 and W2 and elect one of the two candidates.
We first observe that candidate 1 is elected if5
b1 − W1N − 1 (1 + λ) ≥ b2 −
W2
N − 1 (1 + λ), (5)
b1 − W1N − 1 (1 + λ) ≥ 0.
Note that the latter constraint guarantees that voters are better off with the first politician
than without any politicians and sticking to the status quo, which would produce zero
utility. In Propositions 2 and 3, we will state suitable and mild conditions to ensure that
this assumption is not binding. Next we look at the equilibrium in which candidate 1
is elected.
5 For convenience, and except for Proposition 3, we use a tie-breaking rule in favor of candidate 1 if voters
are indifferent between candidates. Otherwise we would need to work with ε considerations.
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Proposition 2 Suppose (1+λ)(c1−c2) ≤ (N +λ)(b1−b2). Then, in any equilibrium
candidate 1 is elected and wage offers satisfy
W1 = (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ + W2.
Wages are indeterminate. In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which candi-
date 1 is elected with minimal wages W min1 and W min2 given by
W min2 =
N − 1
N + λ c1 − (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ ,
W min1 =
N − 1
N + λ c1.
There also exists an equilibrium in which candidate 1 is elected with maximal wages
W max1 and W max2 given by 6
W max2 =
N − 1
N + λ c2,
W max1 = (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ +
N − 1
N + λ c2.
The proof is given in the appendix. An important consequence of Proposition 2
is that wages are indeterminate, i.e., there are infinitely many combinations of pairs
(W1, W2) that can constitute an equilibrium.
The reason for the multiplicity of equilibria can be summarized as follows: Within
the range [W min1 , W max1 ], candidate 2 is either better off when candidate 1 is elected,
or he has no chance of winning the election if he proposes a high wage of W2. Which
candidate is elected depends solely on the wage difference W1 − W2. Hence there is
no anchor for wage W2, which causes the indeterminacy.
Candidate 2 and all voters will strictly prefer the equilibrium associated with
[W min1 , W min2 ] over all other equilibrium wage combinations. Candidate 1, however,
benefits most if [W max1 , W max2 ] is realized. Hence simple refinement criteria, such as
the Pareto principle, cannot reduce the multiplicity of equilibria. In the next step, we
look at equilibria in which candidate 2 wins. Proposition 2 indicates that candidate 1
can ask for higher wages than candidate 2. The wage difference is naturally closely
related to the additional benefits b1 − b2 that candidate 1 will generate for voters.
For λ = 0, the condition in Proposition 2, (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2),
requires that the differential benefits the highly competent politician generates for the
society are larger than the difference of the costs of the politician to provide the public
good.7 Although the condition (1 +λ)(c1 − c2) ≤ (N +λ)(b1 − b2) appears to be the
6 The net utility from electing a candidate must be positive. Hence, b1 − W
max
1
N−1 (1 + λ) ≥ 0 , which is
equivalent to the condition b2 − 1+λN+λ c2 ≥ 0. This is a mild condition which is assumed to hold.
7 Note that the right hand side depends linearly on the size of the electorate, whereas the left-hand side is
independent of scale. This captures non-rivalry of the public good supplied by the office holder.
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more plausible one, we supplement our discussion by characterizing the equilibria in
the opposite case.8
Proposition 3 Suppose (1+λ)(c1−c2) > (N +λ)(b1−b2). Then, in any equilibrium
candidate 2 is elected and wage offers satisfy
W1 = (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ + W2
Wages are indeterminate. In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which candi-
date 2 is elected with minimal wages W min2 and W min1 given by
W min1 = (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ +
N − 1
N + λ c2,
W min2 =
N − 1
N + λ c2.
There also exists an equilibrium in which candidate 2 is elected with maximal wages
W max2 and W max1 given by9
W max1 =
N − 1
N + λ c1,
W max2 =
N − 1
N + λ c1 − (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ .
The proof of Proposition 3 follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 2 and is
therefore omitted. Again, there is a continuum of pairs (W1, W2) that can constitute
an equilibrium.
5 Welfare comparisons
5.1 The general case
In this section we discuss welfare comparisons. We assume that the public determines
the wage in the first scenario in order to maximize welfare in terms of the utilitarian
welfare function. Two views on welfare are present in the literature. Either utilities
of ordinary voters alone are counted, or utilities of all individuals, including the can-
didates. We choose the latter approach for two reasons. First, it is difficult to justify
excluding individuals from welfare considerations (see, e.g., Besley and Coate 1997).
Second, our results tend to be reinforced if we exclude candidates from welfare consi-
derations, since wage competition yields higher remunerations than fixed wages when
the same candidate is elected.
8 In this case tie-breaks are resolved in favor of candidate 2 in order to simplify the exposition.
9 For voters to be better off by electing candidate 2 than with the status quo, the condition b2 − W
max
2
N−1
(1 + λ) ≥ 0 must hold, which in terms of exogenous parameters is b1 − 1+λN+λ c1 ≥ 0. This mild condition
is assumed to hold.
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While in principle the equilibria of Propositions 2 and 3 allow for negative wage
proposals, we restrict our welfare analysis to the plausible case of non-negative wages.
Following the logic of Sect. 3 in the case of a fixed wage, candidate 2 will run for
office for any wage W ≥ c2 − b2, because b2 + W − c2 ≥ 0. Candidate 1 will enter
the political competition if
W ≥ W˜ := N − 1
N + λ
(
c1 − (b1 − b2)
)
.
If W˜ ≤ 0, then the welfare-maximizing wage under a fixed remuneration scheme
W opt is zero. Candidate 1 runs for office for any non-negative wage W and is elected
with certainty. Therefore, the public sets W opt = 0, because otherwise they would
have to incur the wage costs. In this case, welfare, denoted by U fix, is given by
U fix = Nb1 − c1 − λW opt = Nb1 − c1.
If W˜ > 0 and W˜ > c2 − b2, there exist two potentially optimal wage offers. The
first of these wage levels is W opt = c2 − b2, in which case candidate 1 would not
run for office and candidate 2 would be elected. In this case, overall welfare would be
given by
U fix = Nb2 − c2 − λW opt = Nb2 − c2 − λ(c2 − b2).
The second potentially optimal wage level is W opt = W˜ . In this case, candidate 1
would run for office and would be elected with certainty. Overall welfare would be
given as
U fix = Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ .
Therefore, for W˜ > 0 and W˜ > c2 − b2, W opt = W˜ is the optimal remuneration for
politicians, if Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ ≥ Nb2 − c2 − λ(c2 − b2).
If W˜ > 0 and W˜ < c2 − b2, then the welfare maximizing wage under a fixed
remuneration scheme is W opt = W˜ . Candidate 1 runs for office for W˜ and is elected
with certainty. In this case, overall welfare is given by
U fix = Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ .
We turn next to compensation schemes offered competitively by the politicians.
According to Sect. 4, for (1 + λ) (c1 − c2) ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2) candidate 1 offers the
wage
W1 = (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ + W2
and is elected.
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Overall welfare, denoted by U var, is given in this case by
U var = Nb1 − c1 − λW1.
Recall that the minimal and maximal wages are given by Proposition 2.
For (1 + λ) (c1 − c2) > (N + λ)(b1 − b2), candidate 2 is elected with a wage W2
which must satisfy the equilibrium boundaries. Overall welfare is simply:
U var = Nb2 − c2 − λW2,
W2 = W1 − (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ .
Recall that the minimal and maximal wages in this case are given by Proposition 3.
The preceding observations lead to the following result:
Proposition 4
(i) Suppose λ > 0. For sufficiently large N, welfare is always higher under fixed
wages than under competitive wages. In both scenarios the more competent
candidate is always elected.
(ii) Suppose λ = 0. For sufficiently large N, fixed and competitive wages yield the
same welfare.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. Proposition 4 indicates that
fixed wages outperform self-designed remuneration packages as long as the size of
the society is not too small.
The comparisons in the proof illustrate that, under competitive wage offers by
candidates, realized wage costs become higher than they would under fixed and pre-
determined remunerations for politicians. The main intuition for the result is as fol-
lows: Both wage schemes provide a solution for the following trade-off: Higher wages
prompt the more competent politician (as well as the less competent one) to run for
office. This enables voters to elect a competent office-holder, which increases welfare.
Higher wages imply higher tax distortions, which lowers welfare. Consider now the
competitive wage regime. The more able candidate proposes a wage that allows him
to capture all the extra surplus which he generates. This means that wages end up by
being too high. Given the cost of raising public funds, the welfare-optimal wage must
be just high enough to induce the better candidate to run for office so that the extra
surplus generated by that candidate goes to the voters.
It is a little surprising that wage competition leads to excessive wages if we think
of Bertrand competition. However, candidates compete with “differentiated products”
and do not fully take into account the tax distortions they create for society.
5.2 A special case
There are two reasons why it is instructive to consider the case c2 = 0. This case
enables us to provide a simple illustration of the role of candidate competency and the
impact of the shadow costs of funds on the relative welfare comparison between fixed
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and flexible wages.10 As we do not make an assumption regarding N , we first state an
analogous result to Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Suppose λ > 0, then
(i) welfare is always higher under fixed wages than under competitive wages;
(ii) candidate 1 is elected equally or more often under fixed wages than under com-
petitive wages.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the appendix.
Proposition 6 For λ = 0, candidate 1 is elected under fixed wages and competitive
wages equally often as candidate 2. Both scenarios yield the same welfare.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the appendix. Propositions 5 and 6 provide
further insight into the role of tax distortions. The more competent candidate can cap-
ture all the surplus under competitive wages, which creates tax distortions and lowers
welfare compared to fixed wages. Such tax distortions may, however, help candidate
2 to get elected under competitive wages, while candidate 1 is elected under fixed
wages. This further lowers welfare in a competitive wage setting. Higher competency
of office holders with fixed wages can only occur if N is not large, as otherwise Pro-
position 4 applies. If there are no tax distortions (λ = 0), neither of the two potentially
welfare-reducing effects are present, and, as shown in Proposition 6, both scenarios
yield the same welfare.
6 Robustness and extensions
Our paper shows that wage-setting competition does not have welfare-enhancing
effects, as is usually the case with Bertrand competition.
Of course, our model builds on several assumptions, the importance of which we
will discuss in this section. First, we have restricted the number of candidates to two.
In principle, wage competition might become fiercer the more potential candidates
there are. However, as long as individual costs of serving in office vary much less than
the net benefits that candidates can generate, wage competition will depend on the two
best candidates, i.e., the two candidates for whom bi is highest. As a consequence, our
welfare results will still hold in such a setting.11
Second, suppose that citizens incur some small cost of acting as candidates in the
electoral competition. Our equilibria need to be slightly altered as candidates will only
run for office if they have a chance of being elected. While this has no effect in the case
of publicly determined wages, the remuneration the more able candidate can obtain
with competitive wages increases. This further lowers social welfare when wages are
offered competitively. Hence, the welfare comparison remains qualitatively the same
in this case.
10 The case c1 = 0 is more cumbersome.
11 Details are available on request.
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Third, we could assume that the status quo is causing an infinitely negative utility.
This would exclude the fourth case in Proposition 1 and would simplify its proof. The
welfare results remain the same.
Fourth, we have assumed linear deadweight losses. This can be justified as a
first-order approximation to tax distortions when a member of the society has to make
a non-negligible contribution to paying elected public officials. However, since our
main arguments in comparing fixed wages to competitive wages (notably in Sect. 5)
only rely on the existence of positive deadweight costs, our results tend to be robust
to non-linear deadweight costs.
Fifth, imagine a world where there are only imperfect signals about the compe-
tence of candidates, and these signals are observed only after a candidate has decided
to run for office. In this context, pooling equilibria under fixed wages might occur
where some low-competence and low-opportunity-cost candidates mimic the other
types, thus possibly causing a bad-selection problem as identified by Caselli and
Morelli (2004) and Poutvaara and Takalo (2003). But politicians can also destroy poo-
ling equilibria by burning money (through not directly-informative advertising, see
Gersbach (2004). Whether our conclusions hold when there is asymmetric informa-
tion regarding the competency of candidates, and politicians run costly campaigns is
left for future research.
Sixth, an interesting variant of our model12 is to assume, as before, that there are two
candidates with allocations (b1, c1) and (b2, c2), where ci is an increasing function
of bi . Candidate 1 may mimic the somewhat less competent candidate, i.e., he can
undertake b1 at cost c1 or b2 at cost c2. If b1 − c1 > b2 − c2, our result can be applied
in this framework, as candidate 1 has no incentive to imitate candidate 2. If the cost
function is strictly concave, i.e., b1 − c1 < b2 − c2, such a framework creates two
kinds of economic problems.
(i) Even if the public has complete information, candidate 1 may simply implement
b2. This commitment problem will seriously inhibit the functioning of both wage-
setting schemes as candidate 1 will never implement b1. As both candidates will
effectively play type 2, it is straightforward to show that both wage schemes will
lead to the same wage and the same welfare.
(ii) Suppose there is incomplete information for the public regarding the type of
politician and also suppose b1−c1 < b2−c2, such that candidate 1 has an interest
in claiming that he is type 2 if he gets elected. Then we will have pooling equilibria
under competitive wages where both candidates will offer wages according to
type 2 as candidate 1 cannot credibly signal his type. Again, both wage schemes
will yield identical results.
The situation will be different if there is punishment (e.g., reciprocal behavior of
voters, career concerns, reputation losses) when a candidate announces a wage, claims
to be of type 1, and imitates type 2 when elected. How such punishment schemes can
be integrated into our model and how it will affect the balance between publicly
determined wages and competitive wage offers will be an important avenue for future
research.
12 I am grateful to a reviewer for this suggestion.
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7 Conclusion
Our results can be interpreted in several ways. The drawback of competitively offered
wages can be understood as an argument against the general application of the dual
mechanism—incentive contracts and elections—in politics as advocated by Gersbach
(2003).
In a broader perspective, allowing politicians to compete with self-designed com-
pensation packages might involve further adverse consequences. Wealthy candidates
running for office may be able to forgo remuneration from the public completely.
Accordingly, other, less wealthy candidates may not be able to compete on equal
terms in political campaigns. As we intend to examine in subsequent research, this
might undermine a core principle of democracies which says that the pool of can-
didates for political positions should not be constrained a priori. Hence allowing for
competitively offered wages in each term does not appear to be a priority in broadening
the scope of democracies.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Note that if candidate 1 decides to run for office, he will be
elected independently of whether candidate 2 decides to run for office or not. Therefore,
candidate 2 should run for office if and only if his utility from serving as a politician is
greater than zero, which is his utility from the default outcome when no candidate runs
for office. Thus “run for office” is weakly dominant for candidate 2 if b2 +W −c2 ≥ 0.
If b2+W −c2 < 0, “do not run” is weakly dominant. Hence, if W ≥ c2−b2, candidate
2 will run for office. If W ≥ c2 − b2, then candidate 1 will run for office if
b1 + W − c1 ≥ b2 − WN − 1 (1 + λ)
i.e., if his utility from holding office is higher than the utility obtained when candidate
2 is in office. The condition can be transformed into
W ≥ N − 1
N + λ
(
c1 − (b1 − b2)
)
.
If W < c2 − b2, candidate 1 will run for office if b1 + W − c1 ≥ 0 and thus if
W ≥ c1 − b1. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 First note that in order for candidate 1 to be elected, W1 must
satisfy
W1 ≤ (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ + W2
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because otherwise the public is better off electing candidate 2. This follows from Eq.
(5). Therefore, when candidate 1 wants to be elected, he offers the wage
W1 = (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ + W2. (6)
A downward deviation can be excluded, because then candidate 1 could raise his utility
by offering a higher wage and would still be elected. Deviation to a higher wage leads
to the election of candidate 2.
Candidate 1 will not deviate to a higher wage than in (6) and will not leave the
office to candidate 2 if
b1 + W1 − c1 ≥ b2 − W2N − 1 (1 + λ).
Inserting the value of W1 as a function of W2 from Eq. (6), this condition becomes
b1 + (b1 − b2) N − 11 + λ + W2 − c1 ≥ b2 −
W2
N − 1 (1 + λ),
which can be transformed into
(b1 − b2)
(
1 + N − 1
1 + λ
)
+ W2
(
1 + 1 + λ
N − 1
)
≥ c1,
which yields
W2 ≥ N − 1N + λ c1 − (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ (7)
Thus, candidate 1 will want to run for office if condition (7) is fulfilled and accordingly
the proposed remuneration W2 exceeds a certain threshold.
We next examine the optimal choice of W2 by candidate 2. A possible deviation
from the proposed equilibrium in the proposition for candidate 2 would be to offer a
wage W ′2 = W2 −  ( > 0 small) that would lead to his election. Candidate 2 will
not choose this option if
b1 − W1N − 1 (1 + λ) ≥ b2 + W
′
2 − c2,
i.e., if his utility from being a citizen under candidate 1 is higher than his utility from
holding office himself. By inserting the value of W1, as given by (6), we obtain the
condition
b1 − W2N − 1 (1 + λ) − (b1 − b2) ≥ b2 + W2 −  − c2,
which can be transformed into
W2 ≤ N − 1N + λ(c2 + ). (8)
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Therefore, if wage W2 is small enough, candidate 2 would prefer to be a citizen under
candidate 1 rather than running for office for a lower wage.
Therefore, there only exist values for wage offers W2 that satisfy both conditions
(8) and (7) if
N − 1
N + λ c2 ≥
N − 1
N + λ c1 − (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ
and hence we obtain the assumption of the proposition given by
(1 + λ)(c1 − c2) ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 We first prove statement (i). In principle, six different cases
can occur.
Case 1: W˜ ≤ 0, (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
Case 2: W˜ ≤ 0, (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) > (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
Case 3: W˜ > 0, W˜ > c2 − b2 and (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
Case 4: W˜ > 0, W˜ < c2 − b2 and (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
Case 5: W˜ > 0, W˜ > c2 − b2 and (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) > (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
Case 6: W˜ > 0, W˜ < c2 − b2 and (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) > (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
If N is sufficiently large, we obtain (1 + λ)(c1 − c2) < (N + λ)(b1 − b2).
This implies that we can drop the cases 2, 5, and 6. Now we examine the remaining
cases.
Case 1: As candidate 1 is elected under competitive wages, welfare is given by
U var = Nb1 − c1 − λW1.
Under a fixed wage, the wage is set at zero, candidate 1 runs for office
and is elected. We obtain
U fix = Nb1 − c1.
Thus welfare under the fixed wage scenario is equal or greater than under
competitive wages. Note that in both scenarios candidate 1 is elected.
Case 3: To derive our results in case 3, we proceed in four steps.
Step 1: Again, candidate 1 is elected under competitive wages. Due to
Proposition 2 and the assumption of non-negative wages we
obtain
W min2 = max
{
0,
N − 1
N + λc1 − (b1 − b2)
N − 1
1 + λ
}
.
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This yields
W min1 = max
{
N − 1
1 + λ (b1 − b2),
N − 1
N + λc1
}
.
For sufficiently large N we obtain
W min1 =
N − 1
1 + λ (b1 − b2).
Therefore, maximal welfare under competition for wages is
given by
U varmax = Nb1 − c1 − λ
N − 1
1 + λ (b1 − b2).
Step 2: Under a fixed wage, welfare depends on which candidate is
elected. Given the assumptions of case 3 and the non-negativity
of wages, we have
U fix = max
{
Nb2 − c2 − λ max {0, c2 − lb2} , Nb1 − c1 − λW˜
}
.
We now show that for sufficiently large N the public will always
set the wage at W˜ and therefore candidate 1 runs for office and
is elected. As
Nb2 − c2 − λ max {0, c2 − b2} ≤ Nb2 − c2,
it suffices to show that
Nb2 − c2 < Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ .
Step 3: To prove the assertion, we insert W˜ and obtain
Nb2 − c2 < Nb1 − c1 − λ N − 1N + λ(c1 − (b1 − b2)).
This inequality can be transformed into
c1
(
1 + λ N − 1
N + λ
)
− c2 <
(
N + λ N − 1
N + λ
)
(b1 − b2),
which holds for sufficiently large N .
Step 4: We can state now that welfare under fixed wages is given by
U fix = Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ .
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Welfare is higher under a fixed wage scenario if
Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ > Nb1 − c1 − λ N − 11 + λ (b1 − b2).
Inserting W˜ yields
(1 + λ)(c1 − (b1 − b2)) < (N + λ)(b1 − b2).
This inequality holds for sufficiently large N . Again, candidate
1 is elected in both scenarios.
Case 4: Case 4 is analogue to case 3.
Under competitive wages, candidate 1 is elected and the maximal welfare
is given by
U varmax = Nb1 − c1 − λ
N − 1
1 + λ (b1 − b2)
according to the same considerations as in case 3.
Under fixed wages, welfare is given by
U fix = Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ .
As in case 3, welfare is higher under a fixed wage if N is sufficiently large,
and candidate 1 is elected in both scenarios.
Statement (ii) of the proposition follows immediately from the above considerations.
If we insert λ = 0, welfare is given under both wage-setting regimes by Nb1 − c1, as
candidate 1 is always elected. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 We now examine the different cases.
Case 1: Suppose W˜ ≤ 0. This implies c1 ≤ b1 − b2, which can be easily verified
by checking the definition of W˜ . Then (1 + λ)c1 ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2)
holds. Therefore, candidate 1 is elected under competition for wages with
W2 = 0, since W max2 = 0. Accordingly, W1 is given by N−11+λ (b1 − b2).
Welfare is given by
U var = Nb1 − c1 − λ N − 11 + λ (b1 − b2).
Since W˜ ≤ 0, the wage is set at zero with a fixed wage, and candidate 1
runs for office and is elected. We obtain
U fix = Nb1 − c1.
Thus welfare is higher under the fixed wage scenario. In both scenarios
candidate 1 is elected.
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Case 2: Suppose W˜ > 0 and (1 + λ) c1 ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2). Then candidate 1
is elected under competition for wages. Since W max2 = 0, welfare in this
case is given by
U var = Nb1 − c1 − λ N − 11 + λ (b1 − b2). (9)
Under a fixed wage, the public sets the wage at W˜ so that candidate 1 runs
for office and is elected if Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ ≥ Nb2.
For
W˜ := N − 1
N + λ
(
c1 − (b1 − b2)
)
,
this inequality can be transformed into
Nb1 − c1 − λ N − 1N + λ
(
c1 − (b1 − b2)
) ≥ Nb2.
This implies
(b1 − b2) ≥ c1 1 + λN + λ (2 − 1N
) ,
which always holds for (1 + λ) c1 ≤ (N + λ)(b1 − b2) because
(b1 − b2) ≥ c1 1 + λN + λ ≥ c1
1 + λ
N + λ (2 − 1N
) .
This implies that under a fixed wage scenario, candidate 1 will run and
be elected with certainty. We have welfare as
U fix = Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ . (10)
Comparing (9) and (10), welfare is higher under a fixed wage scenario if
W˜ <
N − 1
1 + λ (b1 − b2).
We insert W˜ and rearrange the terms. We obtain
(1 + λ)(c1 − (b1 − b2)) < (N + λ)(b1 − b2).
According to the assumptions in case 2, this inequality holds. Again, in
both scenarios candidate 1 is elected.
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Case 3: Suppose W˜ > 0 and (1+λ) c1 > (N +λ)(b1−b2). In this case, candidate
2 is elected under competitive wages. The welfare under competition for
wages is given by
U var = Nb2 − λW2.
Under the fixed wage framework, welfare is
U fix = max
{
Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ , Nb2
}
.
Hence welfare with wages set by the public is higher than, or equal to,
what it is under competitive wages.
While it is unambiguously clear that welfare is higher under fixed wages,
it is not clear which wage the public will set in this scenario. The wage is
set at W˜ such that candidate 1 runs for office and is elected if and only if
Nb1 − c1 − λW˜ ≥ Nb2,
which can be transformed into
(b1 − b2) ≥ c1 1 + λN + λ(2 − 1N )
.
According to the assumption made in case 3, the upper inequality can
either hold or not. This implies that candidate 1 may be elected under fixed
wages, while under competition for wages, candidate 2 will be elected for
sure.
All in all, welfare is always higher under fixed wages, while candidate 1 is elected
equally or more often under fixed wages than under competitive wages. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 Case 1: Suppose W˜ ≤ 0. This implies c1 ≤ b1 − b2. Hence
c1 ≤ N (b1 − b2) also holds. By Proposition 2 and using λ = 0 and c2 = 0,
we conclude that candidate 1 is elected under competition for wages. Welfare
is given by
U var = Nb1 − c1.
Under a fixed wage, the wage is set at zero, candidate 1 runs for office and
is elected. We obtain
U fix = Nb1 − c1.
In both scenarios, candidate 1 is elected, and welfare is given by Nb1 − c1
both under fixed wages and under competition for wages.
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Case 2: Suppose W˜ > 0 and c1 ≤ N (b1 − b2). This implies that candidate 1 is
elected under competition for wages. Welfare is given by
U var = Nb1 − c1.
Under fixed wages, the public sets a wage no smaller than W˜ so that
candidate 1 runs for office and is elected if and only if Nb1 − c1 ≥ Nb2.
But this inequality holds by the assumption made in case 2. Therefore,
welfare is given by
U fix = Nb1 − c1.
As in case 1, candidate 1 is elected in both scenarios, and welfare is given
by Nb1 − c1.
Case 3: Suppose W˜ > 0 and c1 > N (b1 − b2). Under competition for wages,
candidate 2 is elected and welfare is given by
U var = Nb2.
The public sets a wage strictly smaller than W˜ so that only candidate 2
will run for office and be elected if and only if Nb2 > Nb1 − c1. But this
inequality must hold in case 3. Therefore, welfare is given by
U fix = Nb2.
Hence fixed wages and competitive wages yield the same welfare, and in
both scenarios, candidate 2 is elected.
unionsq
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